Projects
Bad Beliefs, Echo Chambers, and the Epistemic Conditions of Moral Responsibility
My research project is supported by the Philipp Schwartz Initiative of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. It aims to reveal the factors that contribute to the formation of bad beliefs, including the role of epistemic, cognitive, affective, and social conditions. Bad beliefs are inappropriately formed, unjustified beliefs that contradict available evidence and expert consensus (Levi, 2022). The focus of my research is on how echo chambers affect the processes of belief formation and evaluation as well as personal and collective moral responsibility. One way to delve into the relevance of multiple epistemic drivers of bad beliefs is to look at the typical preconditions of echo chambers, where the beliefs of others are systematically ignored or discredited. Because the project aims to investigate the relationship between false beliefs and the echo chamber effect, I consider whether echo chambers are intended to provide epistemic protection against evidence, testimony, and arguments that could refute them.
A specific example of bad beliefs in my research is propaganda, which I study in Ukrainian, Russian, and English-speaking sources. Propaganda has a social dimension and uses specific linguistic tools that are markers of group identification. Its effectiveness depends not only on the power of the language and the skill of the propagandists but also, to a large extent, on people’s preconceptions, values, and preferences. The notorious result of successful propaganda is the polarization of beliefs, which is greatly enhanced by the echo chambers created by the media.
I presume that this approach will also provide a better understanding of typical examples of bad beliefs. Anti-vaccination ideas, conspiracy theories, and fake news are not formed in a vacuum but are a continuation of epistemic, moral, and value-based attitudes that serve as a breeding ground for the development of these beliefs. Thus, the irrationality or gullibility of people who hold bad beliefs is greatly overstated, since there are pragmatic reasons for holding and sharing bad beliefs, such as reducing the moral burden.</p
Olena Komar 